It is reasonable to think that the makers of the Constitution considered the word restriction " to be sufficiently wide to save laws inconsistent " with Art. 387 (e) (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void . I find clear support for this view in the judgment of the Privy Council in Sambasivam v. The delineation is as follows:- 15.

There can be no doubt therefore that they intended the word " restriction " to include cases of " prohibition " also. " To begin with the pictorial aspect differs in many respects and even to a person not versed in the identification of handwritings they would appear to be dissimilar. It is a very substantial doctrine, and it is one of the most fundamental doctrines of all Courts, that there must be an end of litigation, and that the parties have no right of their own accord, after having tried a question between them and obtained a decision of a Court, to start that litigation over again on precisely the same- questions.

Whereas the writer usually wrote ' joo', in the disputed signature this has been changed to 'Joo'. 13 in interpreting the words " reasonable restrictions " on the exercise of the right as used in cl. Section 403 of the Code is no doubt based on the same principle. Kesava Menon had not attended the preliminary meeting of the Board which had been held on May 26, 1956, and the real work of the Wage Board was done after the appointment of Shri K. The letter formations are different; the strokes and the little curls at the end of vertical strokes are all wrong.

The learned senior counsel has also referred to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kamla Kant Singh Ors. There is also a spelling change. " I feel no doubt that the principle of the finality of judgment obtains in criminal law as well as it does in civil law. The Wage Board can in any event be deemed to have been constituted as on that date, viz. 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which says that where by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of the Act, any power is conferred then, unless a different intention appears that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion arises.

The objection urged by the petitioners in this behalf is too technical to make any substantial difference in - regard to the constitution of the Wage Board and its functioning. The greater the restriction, the more the need for strict scrutiny by the Court. 13, that these saving provisions were made, it is proper to remember the words of Art. We have also compared the impugned signature with the admitted signatures with the help of the expert's evidence, and we are inclined to agree with the view of the expert and the learned Judges of the High Court.

, agreed with the observations of Hidayatullah, J. Kesava Menon being accepted by it. D-54 must have been brought into existence at a later stage when Ajodhyaprasad was no more. This detracts somewhat from the force of this argument but the document Exhibit P-81 is merely a copy of a copy and we were unable to compare the signatures as such. 19(1), or " taking away the rights " conferred by the Article, provided this inconsistency or taking away was reasonable in the interests of the different matters mentioned in the clause.

If this is the true position there was nothing objectionable in the Central Government reconstituting the Board on the resignation of Shri K. The word obscenity has been explained in ˜Jowitts' Dictionary of English Law as follows: [1], wherein the High Court dealt with the meaning of the word ˜obscenity. " As it was to remedy the harm that would otherwise be caused by the provisions of Art. The contention that a law prohibiting the exercise of a fundamental right is in no case saved, cannot therefore be accepted.

It is necessary to remember in this connection that s. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya(2)where it was said at p. 8(2) of the Act were in a position to function. We, therefore, agree with the High Court that it has been established that the impugned signature of Ajodhyaprasad in Ex. The learned Counsel for the appellant has not been able to place before us any material to compel us to take a view different from that of the High Court.

This conclusion lends strong support to the respondent's version that Ex. Cherian in his place and stead and it was only after July 14, 1956, that the Wage Board as a whole constituted as it was on that date really functioned as such. We must also give due weight to the 266 observations of the learned Judges. 8 of the Act empowered the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette to constitute a Wage Board. , July 14, 1956, when all the 5 members within the contemplation of s.

It is un- doubtedly correct, however, that when, as in the present case, the restriction reaches the stage of prohibition special care has to be taken by the Court to see that the test of reasonableness is satisfied. But I find no reason to confine its application within the limits of the section. The fact however remains that barring this solitary instance, the admitted signatures contain the' other spelling. The doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine applicable only to records.

This power of constituting the Wage Board must be construed having regard to s.